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The authors analyze lawsuits involving publicly-
appointed lawyers in a labor court in Mexico to study 
how a rigid law is enforced. They show that, even after a 
judge has awarded something to a worker alleging unjust 
dismissal, the award goes uncollected 56 percent of the 
time. Workers who are dismissed after working more 
than seven years, however, do not leave these awards 
uncollected because their legally-mandated severance 
payments are larger. A simple theoretical model is used 
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to generate predictions on how lawsuit outcomes should 
depend on the information available to the worker and 
on the worker's cost of collecting an award after trial, 
both of which are determined in part by the worker's 
lawyer. Differences in outcomes across lawyers are 
consistent with the hypothesis that firms take advantage 
both of workers who are poorly informed and of workers 
who find it more costly to collect an award after winning 
at trial.Enforceability of Labor Law: Evidence from a
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There is little dispute that Mexican labor law is extremely protective of workers.
Botero, et. al. (2004), for example, perform an international comparison of labor
law in which Mexico ﬁgures as one of the countries with the most onerous labor
regulation from the point of view of ﬁrms. An open question, however, is to
what extent this extremely protective legislation is actually enforced.
In this paper, we look inside the black box of enforcement and study how
labor law is applied to individual lawsuits. Speciﬁcally, we analyze alleged
unjust-dismissal lawsuits from a labor tribunal in Mexico and study the process
through which these suits go to trial, reach an out-of-court settlement, or are
dropped. Conditional on going to trial, we analyze both court rulings and
whether or not the workers manage to collect what has been awarded to them.
One institutional feature we document is that it can be very costly for a
worker to collect money that has been awarded at trial by a judge. Consistent
with this observation, we ﬁnd that it is common for trial awards to go uncol-
lected, particularly for cases in which the worker had not worked for long at the
ﬁrm. In this sense, it can be said that the enforcement of labor law is lax for
workers with low (but not trivially low) levels of tenure.
We then develop a simple theoretic framework to develop testable hypothe-
ses on how outcomes should diﬀer depending on the accuracy of the worker’s
information and on the worker’s costs of collecting an award after the judge has
made a ruling. We show that workers with better information should drop fewer
small-stakes cases and more high-stakes cases. We also show that workers with
high costs of collecting awards settle fewer low-stakes cases and may settle more
high-stakes cases.
In any court case, the information available to the plaintiﬀ and the costs of
collecting a court award are determined jointly by the worker and her lawyer.
Workers may diﬀer in terms of their knowledge, memory, or capacity to provide
proof about the facts of the case, while lawyers may diﬀer in terms of know-how
and experience in similar cases. Also, as will be clear later in the paper, the
collection of a payment that has been awarded by a judge certainly requires both
eﬀort from the worker and from the lawyer. Hence our model can be interpreted
as predicting the eﬀects of heterogeneity across worker-lawyer teams in terms
of information and collection costs, where the heterogeneity arises from both
workers and lawyers.
To test the empirical implications of this model across workers, we would
need data on the same worker in a number of cases. This information is not
available in our data, and is generally unavailable in litigation data sets. How-
ever, we can test the empirical implications of the model across lawyers. We
show that informational diﬀerences across lawyers aﬀect lawsuit outcomes and
that diﬀerences in the costs of collecting awards across lawyers aﬀect lawsuit out-
comes, and therefore argue that the same diﬀerences across workers should have
similar eﬀects on lawsuit outcomes. Additionally, to the extent that we show
there are systematic diﬀerences across lawyers that aﬀect lawsuit outcomes, if
workers’ access to legal services is also heterogeneous, diﬀerences across lawyers
1may tend to accentuate the diﬀerences across workers between "nominal" and
"real" protections aﬀorded by the labor law.
Our empirical methodology, in addition to exploiting the fact that we have
multiple observations for a given lawyer, exploits the fact that the assignment
of cases to public lawyers is essentially random. Assignment of cases to lawyers
is based on a short questionnaire that contains only basic characteristics of the
case such as the plaintiﬀ’s gender and tenure, which we can control for in the
econometric models.
We therefore argue that selection of cases to lawyers based on unobservables
is quite unlikely. In fact, when we focus on the 19 public lawyers whom we
observe at least once in a trial and at least once not in a trial, we do not even ﬁnd
evidence that selection of cases to lawyers is correlated with observables. This
essentially random assignment of cases to public lawyers allows us to examine
diﬀerences in outcomes across lawyers and attribute these diﬀerences to the
lawyers themselves, not to the unobservable characteristics of these cases.
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we review
the papers that are most related to what we study. In section 3, we discuss in
some detail the legal framework related to alleged unjust-dismissal lawsuits in
Mexico. In section 4, we discuss the data we use and present evidence that a
signiﬁcant fraction of tried cases result in an award going uncollected. We also
present in section 4 evidence supporting our argument that the assignment of
cases to public lawyers is essentially random. In section 5, we present a simple
model in which a worker anticipates the possibility that it will be too costly
to collect what the judge awards. This possibility aﬀects the entire bargaining
process between the worker and the ﬁrm and therefore generates several testable
implications.
I ns e c t i o n6 ,w ep r e s e n tt h em a i ne m p i r ical results of the paper and relate
them to the theoretical model. In section 7, we reconcile all of our results with
our model by arguing that there must be heterogeneity both in terms of the
accuracy of information and in terms of collection costs. In section 8, we oﬀer
our ﬁnal conclusions.
2 Related literature
Our paper is related to some recent papers that analyze the eﬀects of the de
facto rather than the de jure regulatory environment on economic outcomes.
Lerner and Schoar (2005), for example, ﬁnd that private equity investments
have higher valuations and returns in countries with good enforcement mecha-
nisms. Almeida and Carneiro (2007), examine the eﬀects of diﬀerential enforce-
ment across municipalities of Brazilian national labor regulations and ﬁnd that
increased enforcement causes formal-sector employment and unemployment to
rise and causes self employment to fall. Caballero, et. al. (2006) ﬁnd that the
negative eﬀects of labor-market regulation are particularly strong in countries
where the regulations are likely to be enforced. Dreher and Gassebner (2007)
ﬁnd that corruption, and the accompanying lack of enforcement, can help the
2process of ﬁrm creation in highly-regulated economies. Unlike our paper, these
studies do not examine in depth how regulations are enforced. Rather, they use
proxies for enforcement and relate these variables to other outcomes of interest.
There is also increasing interest in enforcement costs in the law and eco-
nomics literature. For example, Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) argue that
enforcement costs are relevant in patent litigation, and more so for relatively
small and infrequent claimants. Singer (1997) reviews situations in which con-
sumer debt is discharged under U.S. bankruptcy code, so that the debt is never
collected by the creditor. Goodwin (2005) discusses enforcement costs and the
resulting widespread problem of collecting child support payments. It is impor-
tant to stress that these papers, while documenting the existence of enforcement
costs, do not analyze how they aﬀect the ﬁnal outcomes of lawsuits. We believe
that an analysis of the eﬀects of these enforcement costs on individual lawsuit
outcomes is an innovative aspect of our paper.
A few papers attempt to measure enforcement costs and their eﬀects on the
eﬃciency and perceived eﬃciency of the legal system. Djankov, et. al. (2003)
construct an index of formalism for a large group of countries. Some of the
measures they consider are exactly the type of post-trial collection costs that
are the focus of our paper. They consider, for example, whether the notiﬁcation
of a court judgment requires the participation of a court oﬃcer. They also
count the minimum number of procedural actions required to enforce a court’s
judgment. One of their main ﬁndings is that French style civil-law countries
like Mexico have legal systems that are more formalistic on average than those
with other legal systems. They also ﬁnd that higher formalism, including costs
of collection, leads to longer duration of disputes and lower quality of legal
decision-making.
Elena, et. al. (2004) describe in great detail the obstacles to enforcement of
court judgments faced in Peru, which like Mexico inherited a French-style civil-
law system. They document the fact that in Peru all notiﬁcations in a relatively
simple lawsuit require formal summons, including direct participation of a court
oﬃcer. In addition, when notiﬁcation does not result in immediate payment
of the debt, further procedures to force payment are highly bureaucratic and
complicated. They present survey evidence that excessive enforcement costs,
including delays and uncertainty in the enforcement of judgments, are cited by
30% of individuals as main reasons for not using the legal system to collect a
debt. Also, only 44% of respondents believed the enforcement process would
result in actual collection of a debt from a small or medium-sized ﬁrm.
The results from both Djankov, et. al (2003) and from Elena, et. al. (2004)
indicate that enforcement costs are often excessive, and that such costs aﬀect the
quality of the legal system and levels of conﬁdence and use of the judicial process.
However, they do not document how widespread unenforced judgments are in
as p e c i ﬁc area of law, nor do they analyze the eﬀect of this lack of enforcement
on both trial outcomes and pre-trial bargaining and settlement.1
1Elena, et. al. mention evidence from a previous study claiming that on average, three
years after suits have been brought 77% of judgments are still unenforced. However, they
3Since the focus of our paper will be the enforcement of judgments, it is useful
to comment on how well judgments are enforced in Mexico compared to other
countries. Using the methodology described in Djankov, et. al. (2003), the
2008 Doing Business rankings place Mexico 49th out of 178 countries ranked in
terms of how quickly a contract can be enforced. This time is counted from the
moment the plaintiﬀ ﬁles the lawsuit in court until payment. In terms of time
to enforce a judgment, however, Mexico’s rank is 121. We therefore see that the
Mexican judicial system seems particularly ineﬃc i e n ta te n f o r c i n gj u d g m e n t s . 2
One contribution of our paper will be to show how an overly formalistic judicial
system results in poor enforcement in practice.
Our paper is also related to several strands of the literature on litigation.
The ﬁrst of these strands is the theoretical and empirical work on litigation
costs, which have typically focused on two aspects of these costs. One litigation
cost that has been studied is the cost of going to court, including delay in the
resolution of the conﬂict. This work generally shows that the costs of going
to court aﬀect the probability of settlement as well as the characteristics of
cases that end up in court. This means that the selection of cases that go to
trial, as well as the time it takes to reach a settlement, can diﬀer across parties
with diﬀerent costs of going to court. Fenn and Rickman (1999), for example,
estimate a structural model and ﬁnd lower litigation costs imply longer delays
in reaching a settlement. Eisenberg and Farber (1997) develop a model in which
the distribution from which a plaintiﬀ’s litigation cost is drawn aﬀects plaintiﬀ
win rates and aﬀects time to settlement. They posit that individuals are more
heterogeneous in terms of their litigation costs than are corporations. They
then show that, consistent with their theoretic model, individuals have higher
trial rates and lower win rates at trial.
Another cost that has been studied is the cost of legal services, including
the rules for shifting these costs between parties to a dispute. Many studies
have compared the American rule in which each party pays its own legal costs
with the English rule, in which the winning party is compensated for its legal
costs by the losing party. For example, Gong and McAfee (2000) show that
fee-shifting increases the stakes of going to trial and therefore beneﬁts lawyers
by increasing demand for legal services. Gross and Syverud (1991) ﬁnd higher
settlement rates when plaintiﬀs pay their own litigation costs.
Our paper is also related to papers that study the eﬀects of lawyers on lawsuit
outcomes. This literature has most often used a principal-agent framework to
analyze moral hazard problems between clients and lawyers. Rules governing
the compensation of lawyers, such as the percentage of contingency fee charged,
vary across jurisdictions and countries, and this has allowed for the testing
of models that predict how the incentives of the lawyer will aﬀect litigation
mention that there is very little concrete evidence on how much actual enforcement takes
place.
2The data on total time to enforce a contract are available from
http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/EnforcingContracts/. The data on time
to enforce a judgment, which is a component of the total time to enforce a contract, was
provided to us by the Doing Business staﬀ and are available upon request.
4strategy and equilibria. In this area, Helland and Tabbarrock (2003) ﬁnd that
contingency fees increase the quality of litigation and reduce the average time
to settlement. Watanabe (2007) structurally estimates an agency model using
medical malpractice data and ﬁnds that a limitation on contingency fees would
reduce welfare.
A few articles have considered adverse-selection problems between clients
and lawyers, that is, situations in which intrinsic diﬀerences across lawyers
rather than incentives dominate the eﬀects that lawyers have on lawsuit out-
comes. Along these lines, Szmer, et. al. (2007) study lawyer eﬀects in Cana-
dian Supreme Court cases and ﬁnd that more experienced lawyers obtain more
favorable outcomes conditional on going to trial. Nevertheless, the empirical lit-
erature testing such models has been limited by the selection eﬀect arising from
the fact that clients with good cases may be more likely to select good lawyers.
The literature testing moral hazard models also suﬀers from this selection prob-
lem since they assume that lawyers’ eﬀects on lawsuit outcomes are determined
solely by incentives provided through the lawyers’ compensation schemes, and
not by diﬀerences in the lawyers themselves or by diﬀerences in the quality of
their cases.
Kaplan et. al. (2008) studied the determinants of success and case outcomes
in the federal labor courts in Mexico. Among other results, it was found that
controlling for all observables in a lawsuit, including what the worker claims, the
suit appears more successful for the worker when it concludes in settlement. This
evidence is consistent with an asymmetric-information bargaining framework in
which the ﬁrm is the relatively more informed party. Our theoretical model will
assume that the ﬁrm has better information, which implies that workers go to
court when their cases are relatively weak.
3 Legal Framework
As we mentioned earlier, Mexican labor law is highly protective of workers.
The law regulates hours and working conditions, health risks, fringe beneﬁts,
and ﬁring. In this paper we analyze ﬁring lawsuits, so a discussion of the regu-
lation of ﬁring is in order. Under Mexican law, ﬁring can either be considered
justiﬁed or unjustiﬁed. In order for ﬁr i n gaw o r k e rt ob ej u s t i ﬁed under the
law, the worker must have engaged in wrongful behavior such as deliberately
destroying the ﬁrm’s machinery or materials, physically attacking a supervisor,
showing up to work under the inﬂuence of alcohol or drugs, or being absent
from work repeatedly without justiﬁcation. Remarkably, ﬁring a worker for lack
of productivity or laying oﬀ a worker during downturns is not considered to be
justiﬁed.3
In order to ﬁre a worker, a ﬁrm must notify the worker in writing, stating
the cause for ﬁring the worker. Given that ﬁrms must state one of the causes
3The discussion of Mexican labor law in this section is based on the Ley Federal del Trabajo
(LFT), Title II, Chapter IV, as well as on the Reglamento Interior de la Junta Federal de
Conciliación y Arbitraje (Internal Regulations of the Federal Labor Board).
5speciﬁed in the labor code, they often fabricate causes for ﬁring a worker who
is simply unproductive, and this often results in a lawsuit in which the worker
claims the dismissal was not justiﬁed. When sued by a worker, the ﬁrm is
considered to carry the burden of proof in relation to the cause of ﬁring.
Certain components of ﬁring costs do not depend on whether the ﬁring was
justiﬁed or not. In particular, any worker who is ﬁr e di se n t i t l e dt ou n p a i d
overtime and wages, fringe beneﬁts up to the date of ﬁring, as well as severance
pay equivalent to 12 days’ wage per year worked at the ﬁrm. This daily wage,
however, is capped at two times the minimum wage.
When the dismissal is unjustiﬁed under the law, however, ﬁring costs include
several additional elements. First, a worker ﬁred without just cause can sue for
reinstatement. The ﬁrm may only refuse to reinstate for certain categories of
workers such as temporary workers, those with less than one year’s tenure, and
at-will (typically white-collar) employees.
Second, in addition to the compensation due to a worker under any type
of ﬁring, an unjustly-dismissed worker receives two additional payments. She
receives back pay including beneﬁts from the date of ﬁr i n gt ot h ed a t eo fp a y m e n t
of the court award. She also receives three months’ wage with beneﬁts per year
worked at the ﬁrm, as well as an additional 20 days’ salary per year worked
at the ﬁrm if she is an at-will employee. Wages for these calculations are not
capped at any level.
We now describe the mechanisms through which labor law is enforced. In
the ﬁrst place, labor code in Mexico is federal, so that private employees in any
state have access to the same legally-mandated protections. The labor courts
are called Juntas de Conciliación y Arbitraje. They are administrative courts
that belong to the executive branch of government at both the federal and state
levels. Federal labor courts resolve disputes in a number of industries listed in
the federal labor code. All other labor disputes fall under local jurisdiction, so
all states have at least one local junta, and large states will often have several
tribunals with jurisdiction deﬁned by the geographical location of the dispute.
These tribunals are intended to serve both mediation and adjudication func-
tions. The law mandates that they hold at least one conciliation hearing before
proceeding to a court judgment. If the conciliation hearing concludes without
a settlement, another hearing similar to a trial is held. Evidence such as expert
testimony, depositions, and other documents is submitted to the judge during
this hearing. After the conclusion of this hearing, the judge produces a draft
ruling on matters of fact as well as matters of law and submits it to the labor
board, consisting of the judge, a lay magistrate who represents ﬁrms, and a lay
magistrate who represents workers. In order for the proposed draft to become
a valid ruling, at least one of the magistrates must vote along with the judge in
favor of the decision. Finally a hearing is scheduled in which the court’s decision
is read publicly in the presence of the parties to the dispute.
Should the ﬁrm send a legal representative to the hearing in which the court’s
decision is made public, then according to the law the ﬁrm has already been
duly notiﬁed of the decision. However, ﬁrms often do not send a representative
to the hearing, and in this case, the ﬁrm must be notiﬁed by a court clerk.
6In practice, in order for this notiﬁcation to be carried out in a timely fashion,
the plaintiﬀ must participate in the process by making a motion to request
immediate notiﬁcation, as well as accompanying or having her lawyer accompany
the court employee to the ﬁrm’s place of business. This notiﬁcation often takes
some time, and ﬁrms, especially smaller ones, may do their best to avoid being
notiﬁed properly.
Once due notiﬁcation has taken place, the ﬁrm has 72 hours to send payment
to the tribunal. If the ﬁrm does not pay within 72 hours, another hearing must
be scheduled in which the judge should order a court actuary to appraise the
ﬁrm’s assets, seize a suﬃcient number of assets to pay the judgment the ﬁrm
owes, and proceed to a sale of these assets, after which the court pays the
judgment amount to the worker directly.4 This process is akin to putting the
ﬁrm through bankruptcy and therefore can be very costly, especially because
the ﬁrm may block proper notiﬁcation, move its place of business, or hide its
assets. The court’s order of an appraisal and sale of assets should be part of
the same original lawsuit ﬁle from which we extract our data, however we ﬁnd
very few such orders. Discussions with both public and private lawyers have led
us to believe that once ﬁrms have been duly notiﬁed, they generally do pay the
award amount.
At any point before the court’s decision is announced, parties may resolve
their dispute by settlement. However, unlike many other areas of law in Mexico
and elsewhere, the labor courts must both approve and record settlements.
Unratiﬁed settlements are not legally binding, so that parties to a dispute will
generally prefer to have their settlements ratiﬁed by the court. Hence, our data
from lawsuits include detailed information about settlements.
Apart from the protections in the federal labor code, the federal government
and the states provide workers under their jurisdictions with free legal repre-
sentation through public agencies generally called Procuradurías de la Defensa
del Trabajador. The public prosecutors who work for these agencies are licensed
lawyers or interns in their fourth year of law school. Public lawyers are not al-
lowed to receive any compensation from their clients, who are assigned to them
by the agency. They are paid a salary by the agency, which does not depend, at
least not explicitly, on their performance. For methodological reasons that will
be explained later, these public lawyers will be the focus of our empirical work.
4 Data and Preliminary Statistics
We have assembled a data set comprised of all lawsuits ﬁl e di nt h eJunta Local de
Conciliación y Arbitraje del Estado de México - Valle de Cuautitlán, during 2000
and 2001.5 This tribunal is located in an industrial area towards the northern
part of the Mexico City metropolitan area. Overall 718 cases were initiated in
2000 and 1,850 cases were initiated in 2001. Cases involving public lawyers,
4This procedure is governed by Title 15 of the LFT, Articles 939-975.
5These data were obtained by the authors using a new law governing freedom of govern-
mental information in Mexico.
7which will be the focus of this paper, account for 174 cases initiated in 2000
and 491 cases initiated in 2001. There were many more lawsuits ﬁled in 2001
because of the dramatic decline of the maquiladora sector, which represents a
large fraction of cases ﬁled in this tribunal.
For all lawsuits, we observe the motive for ﬁling, which is typically the
allegation of an unjust dismissal, as well as the date of ﬁling. From the initial
ﬁling made by the worker’s lawyer, we observe a description of the job held, the
dates the worker started and stopped working for the ﬁrm, the salary with and
without fringe beneﬁts, hours per week, the worker’s demands, gender, and date
of birth. In ﬁring law suits, workers generally demand reinstatement, back-pay,
overtime, fringe beneﬁts, and severance pay.
In terms of the lawsuits’ outcomes, we observe three modes of termination:
dropped suits, settlements, and trials leading to a judgment by the court. We
record the date of conclusion of the procedure and the payment received by the
worker under a settlement or a court judgment. For trials, we observe a trial
result stated by the court. This result classiﬁes the decision as being in favor
of the ﬁrm, in favor of the worker, or mixed in the sense that the court only
concedes part of the worker’s claim. We also observe the votes of the judge and
the magistrates representing labor and management in favor of or against the
judgment, and the facts of the case as recognized by the judge, including any
payments that the ﬁrm previously made to the worker. Often a court ruling
will result in constitutional appeals by one or both parties, and in these cases,
we record the number of constitutional appeals, who ﬁles the appeals, and we
extract data on the ﬁrst and last court ruling.
We now present some descriptive statistics from the data set. Table 1
presents summary statistics for lawsuits in our sample separately for lawsuits
involving private lawyers, lawsuits involving the 49 public lawyers observed in
the data at least once, and for lawsuits involving the 19 lawyers who we observe
going to trial at least once and not going to trial (dropping or settling) at least
once. The main diﬀerence we see between lawsuits involving public and private
l a w y e r si st h a tﬁnal payoﬀs are substantially bigger in cases involving private
lawyers. We also see that private lawyers tend to go to trial more often.
Some of our empirical models will be identiﬁed by lawyers for whom we
observe both lawsuits that go to trial and lawsuits that do not go to trial.
Restricting the data set to these lawyers essentially removes interns (those who
have not yet completed their law degrees) from the data set. We see from table 1
that this restriction does not substantially aﬀect the descriptive statistics. The
30 lawyers eliminated by this restriction account for only 85 observations.
Perhaps the most important feature we see from table 1 is that, both for
cases involving private lawyers and cases involving public lawyers, it is quite
common for positive awards at trial to go uncollected. In the case of private
lawyers we see that, of 202 lawsuits in which a positive amount was awarded
at trial, this amount was left uncollected 123 times. Similarly in the case of
public lawyers we see that of the 45 lawsuits in which a positive amount was
awarded at trial, the award was left uncollected 25 times. It is important to
note that these are not judgments that were overturned on appeal. As far as
8the court knows, the worker simply decided no to (or was unable to) undertake
the procedures necessary for the collection of the award.
The main reason for focusing on public lawyers is that we believe the assign-
ment of lawsuits to these lawyers was not based on unobservable characteristics.
Court personnel assured us that case assignment was based on a short question-
naire that contained only basic information such as tenure and gender which we
observe. In fact, we were told that tenure of the worker was the most important
factor in determining the assignment of cases to workers.
This essentially random assignment of cases to lawyers will allow us to at-
tribute diﬀerences in lawsuit outcomes to the lawyers themselves. If we ﬁnd
evidence that diﬀerences across lawyers in terms of their information and in
terms of their collection costs are important determinants of lawsuit outcomes,
it will seem natural to conjecture that these same diﬀerences across workers
have similar eﬀects.
We attempt to verify this view of the assignment process in table 2. We
estimate linear models with lawyer ﬁxed eﬀects for two characteristics of the
case: a female worker dummy and years of tenure. Table 2 presents the results
of the F-tests of the null hypothesis that there is no heterogeneity across lawyers.
The results for private lawyers are quite strong; both gender and years of tenure
are strongly correlated (at the 0.01 level) with the lawyer ﬁxed eﬀects. That
is, case assignment is far from random. When we use all public lawyers, we see
that years of tenure is strongly correlated (at the 0.01 level) with the lawyer
ﬁxed eﬀects, but gender does not appear to be correlated with these lawyer
ﬁxed eﬀects. These results are consistent the assertions of court personnel that
tenure was the main variable used to assign cases to lawyers. When we restrict
our analysis to the 19 public lawyers for which we observe at least one case that
went to trial and at least one that did not, we no longer see any evidence of
non-random assignment. That is, neither gender nor years of tenure appear to
be correlated with the lawyer ﬁxed eﬀects.
We believe that the results from table 2 are encouraging for our analysis.
The assignment of lawsuits to lawyers could not have been based on things like
the strength of the worker’s claim because there would be know way to read
such information from the short questionnaire ﬁlled out by the plaintiﬀs. When
we restrict our analysis to the 19 lawyers for whom we observe both at least one
lawsuit that goes to trial and at least one that does not, we do not even observe
as i g n i ﬁcant correlation between the observable characteristics and the lawyer
ﬁxed eﬀe c t s .T h e s e1 9l a w y e r sc a nb ev i e w e da st h eb a s i cs t a ﬀ of the court.
We now turn to the issue of whether diﬀerent lawyers indeed appear to act
diﬀerently. In table 3 we investigate whether there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences
across lawyers in their probabilities of a lawsuit ending by being dropped, by
being settled, or going to trial. We estimate random-eﬀects logit models with
no independent variables in which the dependent variable is one of the three
possible modes of termination. We present the chi-bar-square statistics of the
test of the null hypothesis that all lawyers have equal probabilities that the case
will be dropped, settled, or go to trial.
Looking ﬁrst at the models for private lawyers, we reject the null hypothesis
9at the 0.01 level for all three termination modes. One may suspect, however,
that these results are strongly aﬀected both by diﬀerences in observable and
unobservable characteristics of the cas e sa c r o s sl a w y e r s .W h e nw eu s ea l lp u b l i c
lawyers, we reject the null hypothesis that lawyers have the same probabilities
of dropping and settling their cases at the 0.01 level. We only reject the null
hypothesis that all public lawyers have the same probabilities of going to trial
at the 0.10 level. Using only the 19 public lawyers with one trial and one non-
trial outcome, we again reject the null hypothesis that lawyers have the same
probabilities of dropping and settling their cases at the 0.01 level and ﬁnd no
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in their probabilities of going to trial. We will exploit the
fact that we ﬁnd strong diﬀerences in settling and dropping probabilities in the
subsequent analyses.
Since cases in which lawyers do not collect a positive trial award will be
a key focus of our analysis, we want to explore these cases a bit more. The
cases in which a positive award is left uncollected do not appear to be of trivial
stakes. In the case of private lawyers, a judge awarded a positive amount to
the worker in 202 cases. In the 123 cases in which the positive award was
left uncollected, average years tenure was 3.76 and the median was 2.46. The
analogous ﬁgures for the 79 cases in which a positive award was collected are 3.43
and 1.59. Surprisingly the cases in which a positive award is not collected appear
if anything to be higher stakes cases, although the non-random assignment of
cases to private lawyers makes these comparisons suspect.
When we analyze the data for public lawyers, we see that the judge awarded
a positive amount in 45 cases. In the 25 cases in which the award was not
collected, average tenure was 1.92 with a median of 1.51. In the 20 cases in
which a trial award was collected, average tenure was 5.98 with a median of
2.59.6 Another way to see that awards in high-tenure cases get collected is to
note that there were seven cases in which a worker with more than seven years
of tenure was awarded a positive amount at trial. In all seven of these cases the
award was collected.
It is clear that, at least in the case of public lawyers for whom we believe
that the assignment of cases to lawyers is close to random, cases in which a
positive award is not collected tend to be lower-stakes cases. Nevertheless,
these uncollected awards do to appear to be from trivially small cases. Razú
(2006), for example, ﬁnds that 75% of newly-hired workers in Mexico do not
stay continuously with the employer for one year. Kaplan, et. al. (2007) ﬁnd
that about 38% percent of formal-sector workers in Mexico were hired within
the past year. We therefore see that a substantial fraction of employment at any
given time has tenure below the median tenure observed for uncollected awards.
6The results from the 19 public lawyers with at least on trial and one non-trial outcome
look nearly identical to the results for all public lawyers.
105 Simple Bargaining Model with Collection
Costs
In order to derive testable implications about the bargaining process, we con-
sider a model in which a worker brings a lawsuit against a ﬁr m .W ea s s u m et h a t
the worker maximizes her expected payment net of legal costs. We assume that,
i ft h ec a s eg o e st ot r i a l ,t h ej u d g ew i l la w a r dVε . For simplicity we assume that
the ﬁrm has perfect information both about the lawsuit and about the worker.
We will further assume that the worker always observes V ,a n do b s e r v e sε with
probability λ. The timing of the game is as follows:
1. The worker observes V . With probability λ, the worker also observes ε.
With probability 1 − λ, the worker does not observe ε.I n t h i s c a s e ,t h e
worker simply knows that ε is drawn from a uniform distribution on the
unit interval.
2. The worker decides whether to drop the case or not. If the case is dropped,
the payoﬀ to the worker is zero. If the case is not dropped, the worker
pays a cost of CO to proceed to the oﬀer stage.
3. If the case has not been dropped, the worker makes a take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀer to the ﬁrm. The worker asks to receive a payoﬀ of S.I f t h e ﬁrm
accepts the oﬀer, payment is made and the game ends. If the ﬁrm rejects
this oﬀer, the case goes to trial and the judge awards Vεto the worker.
4. If the worker pays a cost of CC, she receives the award. If not, the worker
receives nothing. We will assume that CC >C O.
The model can be solved quite simply. First, consider the cases in which the
worker observes ε.I fVε<C C, the case will be dropped. If not, the worker will
make a settlement oﬀer of Vε , that will always be accepted by the ﬁrm. Hence,
when the worker observes the true value of the case, the lawsuit will never end
up in court.
Now consider the case in which the worker does not observe ε.I fVε<C C
and the parties have reached the oﬀer stage, the ﬁrm will not accept any oﬀer
since the ﬁrm knows that the judge’s award will not be collected. Conditional on
Vε≥ CC,a no ﬀer CC or less will be accepted with probability one. Therefore
the worker will never oﬀer less than CC.
The expected payoﬀ (excluding the cost of making an oﬀer which would have

















How do we arrive at this expression? With probability CC
V ,t h ej u d g e ’ sa w a r d
w o u l db et o os m a l lt ob ec o l l e c t e d ,s oa n yo ﬀer will be rejected and the payoﬀ to
the worker will be zero. With probability S−CC
V ,t h eo ﬀer will be rejected by the
11ﬁrm even though the award will be large enough to be collected. The expected
judgment conditional on being in this situation is S+CC
2 , but the worker will be
forced to pay a cost of CC to collect the award. With probability V −S
V ,t h eo ﬀer
will be accepted and the payoﬀ is simply S. It is straightforward to show that
the optimal oﬀer made by the worker is7
S∗ =
½
V − CC if V ≥ 2CC
CC if V< 2CC. (2)
We now consider two potential sources of heterogeneity across workers in
order to derive testable implications of the model. The ﬁrst form of heterogene-
ity is that the workers diﬀer in their values of λ,t h a ti s ,w o r k e r sd i ﬀer in the
accuracy of their information about the case. If this were true, workers with
better information would be less likely to drop low-stakes (low V ) cases and
more likely to drop high-stakes (low V )c a s e s .
H o wc a nw es e et h a tt h i si st r u e ?N o t eﬁrst that a worker who never observed
ε (λ =0 ) would have a cutoﬀ level of V below which she will always drop the case
and above which she will never drop the case. A worker who always observed
ε (λ =1 ), on the other hand, would drop cases if and only if Vε<C C.T h i s
means that, even if V is very close to CC, the perfectly-informed worker will
have a positive probability of not dropping the case. Furthermore, even if V is
extremely large, the perfectly-informed worker will have a positive probability
of dropping the case.
What other predictions do we have about workers if we assume they only
diﬀer in terms of the quality of their information (λ)? Since all cases get settled
when Vε ≥ CC and the worker observes ε, better-informed workers should
always have settlement probabilities that are at least as high as those of workers
with worse information. Further, better-informed workers should always have
lower probabilities of a trial than workers with worse information, but since we
observe relatively few trials in the data, this hypothesis will be diﬃcult to test.
As mentioned in the introduction, these testable implications could relate
to comparisons of the outcomes of diﬀerent cases for the same worker. Since
we do not observe workers multiple times in the data, we cannot use workers
to test these implications. We do, however, observe lawyers multiple times
in the data. We will therefore test these hypotheses using lawyers, implicitly
making the reasonable assumption that the information used by the worker-
lawyer team is a combination of worker information and lawyer information.
The essentially random assignment of cases to lawyers guarantees that there
should be no correlation between the quality of worker information and the
quality of lawyer information. Nevertheless, the eﬀects of diﬀerences in worker
information and diﬀerences in lawyer information should be the same.
We will not, unfortunately, observe any proxy for the quality of the lawyer’s
information (λ). We will, however, observe a proxy for the stakes of the case
7It is very easy to add a cost of going to trial to the model. Assume, for example, that the
worker’s lawyer has to pay a cost of Ct if the case goes to trial. The resulting optimal oﬀer
would be S∗ = V − CC − Ct if V − CC − CT ≥ CC and S∗ = CC if V − CC − CT <C C.
12(V ). In particular, we argue that the tenure at the ﬁrm of the dismissed worker
is a good proxy for the stakes of the case. Assuming that lawyers only diﬀer in
terms of the quality of their information, we can rewrite the testable hypotheses
in the following way:
i) Lawyers with high probabilities of dropping low-stakes cases will have
low probabilities of dropping high-stakes cases.
ii) Lawyers with high probabilities of settling low-stakes cases will have
high probabilities of settling high-stakes cases.
The other potential source of heterogeneity that we consider in this paper is
that workers diﬀer in their costs of collecting awards (CC). The ﬁrst (trivial)
testable implication in this case is that, conditional on any value of V ,w o r k e r s
with high collection costs will have dropping probabilities that are at least as
high as those for workers with lower costs.
We now turn to settlement probabilities assuming workers diﬀer in their
collection costs. As λ (the probability of observing the true value of the suit)
approaches 1, all cases that are not dropped will settle, since both parties will
k n o wt h et r u ev a l u eo ft h ec a s e . A l s o ,s i n c et h ew o r k e ra n dh e rl a w y e rk n o w
the true value of the case, for any value of V , the case will be dropped with a
higher probability when collection costs for the worker-lawyer team are higher.
Since settling and dropping are the only two case outcomes, this means that for
any value of V , a worker with higher costs of collection is less likely to settle.
As λ approaches zero, however, the story is more complicated.
Note ﬁrst that, conditional on the suit not being dropped and conditional
on ε not being observed, settlement will occur whenever the true value of the
suit (Vε ) is greater than the settlement oﬀer (S∗) given by equation 2. Simple
inspection of equation 2 reveals that the optimal settlement oﬀer is higher for
high-cost workers when V is low and is lower for high-cost workers when V is
high. We therefore see that if CO =0 , which would imply that no suits are
dropped, workers with high collection costs would have lower probabilities of
settling low-V suits and higher probabilities of settling high-V suits.
The intuition behind the above result is straightforward. When the stakes of
t h ec a s ea r eh i g h ,aﬁrm views oﬀers from high- and low-cost workers similarly
since, conditional on going to trial, all workers will collect with probability close
to one. In the bargaining stage, however, a high-cost worker will ask for less
money and therefore settle more often since she is more anxious to avoid the
trial. Hence for high-stakes cases, a high-cost worker is more likely to settle.
This is exactly how a standard cost of going to trial operates in the literature.
When the stakes of the case are high, which implies that awards will almost
never be left uncollected, a cost of going to trial and a cost of collecting an
award are eﬀectively the same thing.
When the stakes of the case are low, however, the ﬁrm anticipates that a
high-cost worker will not collect the award. Therefore in a low-stakes case a
high-cost worker is less likely to settle because the ﬁrm views a trial as a good
outcome. In our model this translates into settlement occurring whenever the
13true value of the case exceeds the worker’s collection costs. This implies a lower
probability of settling for workers with high collection costs and low values of
V . The possibility that a high-cost worker will settle with a lower probability,
even if cases are never dropped, diﬀerentiates our model from those with costs
of simply going to trial.
How do we incorporate dropped cases into our analysis of the eﬀect of col-
lection costs on settlement probabilities? The fact that a high-cost worker will
have a higher cutoﬀ level of V required to not drop the case only reinforces the
result that, when λ is small, high-cost workers will have lower settlement prob-
abilities for low-V cases. To see this, one only has to note that the high-cost
worker will have a higher cutoﬀ value of V in order to proceed with the case. If
the high-cost worker is below her cutoﬀ value of V , her probability of settling
will be zero. Once V is high enough, dropped cases cease to be an issue and
our previous analysis that high-cost worker will settle with higher probabilities
remains intact.
Once again, we will use lawyers as a way of informing us about the eﬀects
of these costs on lawsuit outcomes. We do not observe any proxy for collection
costs, but we will continue to use tenure as a proxy for the stakes of the case.
Assuming that lawyers only diﬀer in terms of their collection costs, we therefore
summarize out testable implications in the following way:
iii) Lawyers with high probabilities of dropping low-stakes cases will have
high probabilities of dropping high-stakes cases.
iv) Lawyers with high probabilities of settling low-stakes cases may have
low probabilities of settling high-stakes cases.
Although the relation between the settlement probability for low-stakes cases
and the settlement probability for high-stakes cases is theoretically ambiguous if
lawyers only diﬀer in terms of collection costs, settlement probabilities will still
be central to our empirical analysis. If we ﬁnd evidence that lawyers who settle
low-stakes cases tend not to settle high-stakes cases, we will be able to reject
the hypothesis that lawyers diﬀer only in terms of their information. Such a
ﬁnding would therefore imply that diﬀerences in collection costs across lawyers
aﬀect lawsuit outcomes. Since it can be also extremely costly for the workers
in terms of time to collect awards after trials, it seems likely that diﬀerences
across workers in collection costs should have similar eﬀects on outcomes.
The primary goal of the empirical section will be to test the above hypotheses
empirically. We will begin, however, by presenting evidence that these costs
of collecting awards signiﬁcantly impact the bargaining and trial outcomes we
study. We will also present some results we believe are interesting, although not
strictly related to the theoretical model.
6 Empirical Analysis
Our ﬁrst goal in this section is to demonstrate that costs associated with col-
lecting awards must be taken into account in order to understand how lawsuits
14are resolved. For the rest of the paper, we will only use data from the 19 lawyers
with at least one trial and one non-trial outcome. We will do this because some
of our models, like the one we present below, compare outcomes of lawsuits
that go to trial to outcomes of lawsuits that do not go to trial for the same
lawyer. Lawyers who do not have at least one lawsuit that goes to trial and at
least one that does not go to trial contribute very little to these estimations.
The inclusion of these lawyers, however, would require the estimation of many
more parameters in a non-linear model. As we mentioned earlier, the inclusion
of these lawyers would require the estimation of an additional 30 lawyer eﬀects
while only adding an additional 85 observations.
Consider now the following model:
posil = β1tenureil (1 − trialil)+β2tenureil ∗ trialil+
β3genderil (1 − trialil)+β4genderil ∗ trialil + β5trialil+
αl (1 − trialil)+γαltrialil + εil
(3)
where the subscript i denotes the case and the subscript l denotes the lawyer.
The dependent variable posil is a dummy variable equal to one if the worker
recovers a positive award. If the case ended in a trial ruling, the dummy will be
equal to one if the worker was awarded a positive amount at trial and if this
award was in fact collected. If the lawsuit did not end in a trial ruling, then posil
is simply a dummy variable for whether the case was settled (all settlements are
for positive amounts) as opposed to being dropped. We consider two observable
characteristics: gender and tenure, and allow the eﬀects of these variables to be
diﬀerent for trial and non-trial outcomes. We also allow trials to have a diﬀerent
intercept than do lawsuits that do not end as trials.
We estimate the parameter αl f o re a c hl a w y e r ,w h i c ha m o n go t h e rt h i n g s
captures the diﬀerences in settlement probabilities across lawyers, controlling for
gender and tenure and conditional on the case not going to trial. Note also that
γ, through the parameter αl,a l s oa ﬀects the probability of recovering a positive
amount at trial. Since the two parameters γ and αl enter multiplicatively in the
last term of the equation, we estimate this model with non-linear least squares.8
The ﬁrst column of table 4 presents the results of the estimation of equation
3. The ﬁrst result to point out is that the estimate of β2 is 0.04 and statistically
signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level. This result tells us that, conditional on going to
trial, workers with high tenure tend to collective positive awards. We also see
that the estimate of γ is -1.06 and is signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level. This means
that lawyers who tend to settle cases that do not go to trial (ones with high
values for αl) tend not to collect positive awards for cases that go to trial.
We therefore see that cases that go to trial are more likely to end with the
worker collecting something when the worker was employed for a long time at
the ﬁrm and when the worker’s lawyer drops a high fraction of cases that do
not go to trial. One simple explanation for these results is that these types of
8Some cases are grouped together in the same lawsuit. We calculate the standard errors
of our estimated parameters allowing for arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allowing for an
arbitrary correlation of the error terms among cases grouped together in the same lawsuit.
15cases receive more favorable rulings at trial. Another explanation is that these
types of cases do not receive more favorable rulings, but that awards in these
cases are more likely to be collected. The results from columns 2-5 of table 4
support the latter explanation.
In column 2 we estimate a model similar to equation 3 in which the dependent
variable continues to be posil for lawsuits that do not go to trial. For lawsuits
that do go to trial, however, we use as the dependent variable a dummy for
whether the judge declares her ruling to be favorable for the ﬁrm. Columns
three and four present the analogous estimations examining the trial rulings of
favorable for the worker and mixed respectively. Since the none of the estimated
values of β2 or γ from columns 2-4 are statistically signiﬁcant, we see no evidence
that high-tenure cases are more likely to receive favorable rulings at trial and
no evidence that lawyers who drop a lot of cases receive more favorable rulings
at trial.
In column 5, however, we use a dummy variable for "not collecting a positive
amount awarded at trial" as the trial outcome measure. Since the estimate of
β2 is -0.03 and signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level, we see that awards from high-tenure
cases tend to be actually collected. Furthermore, since the estimate of γ is
1.49 and signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level, we see that lawyers who tend to settle
many cases also tend to leave positive awards uncollected at trial. Combining
the information from all columns of table 4, we see that workers in high-tenure
cases tend to collect something at trial, not because they do better in terms of
trial outcomes but rather because the awards are actually collected. Similarly,
lawyers who settle many cases tend not to collect positive amounts for their
clients at trial not because they do worse in terms of trial outcomes, but rather
because they simply tend not to collect positive awards for their clients.
The results on tenure are obviously consistent with the theoretical model
if we view tenure as a proxy for the stakes of the case (V ). But what do the
results on lawyers have to do with the theoretical model? Perhaps the easiest
interpretation of the results on lawyers from table 4 is that the lawyers who drop
a lot of cases do so because they have better information. Consistent with the
model, these lawyers should tend not tog ot ot r i a lw h e nt h ea m o u n ta w a r d e d
is likely to be too small to bother collecting. Indeed, we will present further
evidence in favor of this hypothesis?
Can the results on lawyers from table 4 be consistent with the idea that
lawyers simply diﬀer in their costs of collecting trial awards? If we made the
(ridiculous) assumption that gender and tenure were the only variables observed
by the lawyer, the results in table 4 would seem to contradict the predictions
of this hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, lawyers who settle (do not
drop) a lot of (non-trial) cases should have low costs of collecting trial awards,
and therefore should tend to collect positive amounts with higher probabilities.
Furthermore, lawyers who settle (do not drop) a lot of (non-trial) cases should
have lower probabilities of not collecting positive awards at trial.
Of course the lawyer should observe many things that we do not observe as
econometricians. Suppose, for instance, that we observe two cases with diﬀerent
lawyers in which tenure has a low value. Suppose further that neither of these
16cases is dropped. If we know that one lawyer has low costs of collecting trial
awards, the fact that we observe that she did not drop the case might not
be surprising. If, however, we know that the other lawyer has a high cost
of collecting a trial award, it is surprising to see that the case has not been
dropped. It is therefore likely that some unobservable (to the econometrician)
characteristics of the case are quite favorable.
We could therefore rationalize the results in table 4 in the following way.
Lawyers with high costs of collection end up dropping many cases. Conditional
on going to trial, these lawyers with high costs therefore have cases that are
stronger for unobservable reasons. Since the tried cases for high-cost lawyers
are in fact stronger, it is quite natural to see that the high cost lawyers tend to
recover positive awards for their clients. If you thought that lawyers with high
costs of collecting awards also had high costs of proceeding with the case in the
ﬁrst place (that is, not dropping the case early on), this "selection eﬀect" would
be even stronger. We will in fact present evidence in favor of the hypothesis
that diﬀerences in collection costs also play an important role.
In summary, we do not believe the results on lawyers from table 4 are par-
ticularly helpful in testing our hypotheses. We do believe, however that table
4 demonstrates that the collection costs, which are the emphasis of our entire
paper, are important factors both for explaining why low-tenure cases do not
collect awards after trial and for explaining diﬀerences across lawyers. We now
turn to empirical exercises that are more closely linked to our hypotheses.
If we believe that workers diﬀer in the quality of their information, the
theoretical model makes a clear prediction on dropped cases. Workers with
better information should drop fewer low-stakes (low V ) cases, because they
will be able to separate out the few low stakes cases that are very likely to lead
to a judgment that is worth collecting. Workers with better information should
also drop more high-stakes (high V ) cases since they will be able to recognize
the few high V cases that are not worth the eﬀort. The model therefore predicts
that workers who are more likely to drop small cases should be less likely to drop
large cases.
As mentioned earlier, we would need multiple observations on workers to test
this hypothesis with workers directly. Since we do observe lawyers multiple times
in the data, we can use lawyers to test the general hypothesis that informational
diﬀerences are important determinants of lawsuit outcomes. To the extent that
this hypothesis is conﬁrmed with lawyers, it seems likely to be true for workers
as well.
In order to test this prediction, we estimate the following equation:
dropil = αl + β1femaleil + β2tenureil + γαl ∗ tenureil + εil. (4)
Equation 4 also has to be estimated by non-linear least squares. The pa-
rameter αl measures the lawyer’s propensity to drop a lawsuit when tenure is
equal to zero. A negative value for the parameter γ would imply that, for a
large enough value of tenure, lawyers who are more likely to drop when tenure
is low are less likely to drop when tenure is high. We present the results of
estimating equation 4 in the ﬁrst column of table 5.
17As predicted by the theoretical model when lawyers diﬀer in the accuracy of
their information, our estimate of γ is negative (-0.14) and statistically signiﬁ-
cant at the 0.01 level. According to this estimation, lawyers would be predicted
to have the same dropping probabilities when tenure is 7.20 years. This ﬁgure
is a bit worrisome since tenure of 7.20 years corresponds to the 90th percentile
of the tenure distribution in our data, that is, there are very few observations
with a tenure level higher than 7.20. To address this concern, we estimated
an equation similar to equation 4, but with a more ﬂexible functional form for
tenure. Speciﬁcally we estimated
dropil = β1femaleil + αl + β2tenureil + γ1αl ∗ tenureil+
β3tenure2





il + γ4αl ∗ tenure4
il + εil.
(5)
We present the results of estimating equation 5 in column 2 of table 5.
Importantly, lawyers with high probabilities of dropping when tenure is low are
now estimated to have lower probabilities of dropping when tenure is greater
than 3.58, which is at the 75th percentile of the tenure distribution. To make
the results of table 5 more transparent, we plot in ﬁgure 1 the estimated values
of the derivative of the dropping probability with respect to αl, for all tenure
values up until 23.98 which is the 99th percentile of the tenure distribution. We
do this both for the equation in which tenure is entered linearly and for the case
in which tenure is entered as a quartic.
Since we believe this "switching point" in the probabilities of dropping is a
crucial test of the hypothesis that lawyers diﬀer in terms of the accuracy of their
information, we explore this issue further. In column 3 of table 5, we present
estimates of the following equation:
dropil = β1femaleil + αl ∗ (tenureil < 3.58) + β2 (tenureil ≥ 3.58)+
γαl ∗ (tenureil ≥ 3.58) + εil. (6)
The cutoﬀ value of 3.58 to separate low and high tenure was chosen because
our estimation of equation 5 indicated that lawyers with high probabilities of
dropping when tenure is low were estimated to have lower probabilities of drop-
ping when tenure is greater than 3.58. The estimated value for γ is -1.42 and is
statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
In column 4 of table 5 we re-estimate equation 6, but only using tenure
values in the bottom quartile (tenure ≤ 0.55) or tenure values in the highest
quartile (tenure ≥ 3.595). The idea behind this estimation is to throw out the
observations from tenure ranges in which the diﬀerences between lawyers are
estimated to be small. Our estimate of γ is now -1.61 and is signiﬁcant at the
0.05 level. Overall we believe that there is considerable empirical support for
the model’s prediction that lawyers who drop a high percentage of low-stakes
cases will drop a low percentage of high-stakes cases. In other words, the results
from table 5 support the hypothesis that lawyers diﬀer in terms of the accuracy
of their information. It is also worth noting that we could not rationalize the
18r e s u l t so ft a b l e5i fw et h o u g h tt h a tl a w y e r sd i ﬀer only in their costs of collecting
awards. A high-cost lawyer would be more likely to drop all cases.
The results from table 5 are therefore consistent with the hypothesis that
informational diﬀerences aﬀect lawsuit outcomes. Although we conﬁrmed this
hypothesis using heterogeneity across lawyers, there is no doubt enormous het-
erogeneity across workers in terms of their information. In this sense, the results
from table 5 almost certainly indicate that labor law will be enforced less strictly
for workers who lack the information necessary to defend their rights.
Now that we have presented evidence that informational diﬀerences are im-
portant determinants of lawsuit outcomes, we turn to evidence that the costs of
collecting awards are also important determinants of lawsuit outcomes. Recall
that if workers diﬀer in terms of their collection costs, it is possible for workers
with high probabilities of settling low-stakes cases to have low probabilities of
settling high-stakes cases. Such a result, however, would be inconsistent with
the hypothesis that workers only diﬀer in terms of the quality of their infor-
mation. We therefore estimate models like in table 5 (equations 4, 5, and 6),
but use settlement as the dependent variable instead of the case being dropped.
Once again, we use diﬀerences across lawyers to establish that diﬀerences in
collection costs are important determinants of lawsuit outcomes.
We present the results of estimating settlement probabilities in table 6. In
column one we present the results of estimating an equation analogous to equa-
tion 4, but with settlement as the dependent variable instead of dropped cases.
Once again we estimate γ to be negative (-0.13) and statistically signiﬁcant
at the 0.01 level, implying that those lawyers with high settlement probabilities
when tenure is low have lower settlement probabilities when tenure is high. This
"switching point" occurs when tenure is 7.97 years, which is the 91st percentile
of the tenure distribution. When estimating the analogy of equation 5 for set-
tlement probabilities, we estimate that the switching point occurs at a tenure of
3.46 years, which is the 74th percentile of the distribution of tenure. In ﬁgure
2, we once again plot the estimated values of the derivative of the probability
of dropping with respect to αl.
We again present the results of some "less parametric" models like equation
6, this time using 3.46 years as the cutoﬀ between high and low tenure. When
we use all of the data, we estimate γ to be negative (-0.46) but not statistically
signiﬁcant (p-value of 0.106). When eliminating observations from the middle
two quartiles of the tenure distribution, we now estimate γ to be negative (-0.79)
and statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level. Overall table 6 presents evidence
that lawyers may also diﬀer in terms of their costs of collecting awards. In
particular, lawyers who settle with high probabilities when the stakes of the
case are low (lawyers with low collection costs in the theoretical model) settle
with lower probabilities when the stakes of the case are high.9
The results in table 6, therefore, support the hypothesis that heterogeneity
9Since the results of analyzing equations like equations 4, 5, and 6 for trial outcomes do
not give clear empirical results and do not relate to the theoretical model in an obvious way,
we do not report the results of these models. We are happy to provide these results upon
request.
19in terms collection costs aﬀects lawsuit outcomes. Since we have found evidence
for heterogeneity in terms of collection costs across lawyers, it seems extremely
likely that this same sort of heterogeneity exists across workers. In fact, the main
cost of collection is that both the worker and the lawyer accompany the court
clerk when she attempts to notify the ﬁrm about the judge’s ruling. Certainly
the value of time varies across workers much as it does across lawyers. In this
sense, it seems likely that workers with high collection costs do not receive the
full beneﬁts to which they are entitled. They will drop many cases when they
have a legitimate case, they may accept low settlement amounts in order to
avoid trying to collect, or they may leave awards uncollected after trials.
We view the results in tables 5 and 6 as the results that are most directly
linked to our model. In table 7, however, we present some models that we believe
are interesting although not related in a clear way to our theory. In particular,
we estimate the following equation in column one of table 7:
posil = β1tenureil (1 − trialil)+β2tenureil ∗ trialil+
β3genderil (1 − trialil)+β4genderil ∗ trialil + β5trialil+
αl (1 − trialil)+γ1αltrialil + γ2αltenureil ∗ trialil + εil.
(7)
The parameters αl capture (much like in equation 3), among other things,
the diﬀerences in settlement probabilities across lawyers, controlling for gender
and tenure and conditional on the case not going to trial. The parameter γ1 now
captures how settlement probabilities conditional on not going to trial (αl)a ﬀect
the probability of recovering a positive amount at trial when tenure equals zero.
The key feature of this model is that, through the parameter γ2, the diﬀerences
in recovering something at trial between lawyers who settle or drop most of their
non-trial cases can vary with tenure.
We see from column one that the estimate of γ2 is -0.18 and statistically
signiﬁcant. That is, lawyers who drop a lot of cases do comparatively worse
in low tenure cases, which one may argue is consistent with the theoretical
model although we certainly have not resolved the selection issues that made
our interpretation of the results from table 4 diﬃcult. We think, however, that
t h em o r ei n t e r e s t i n gr e s u l t sc o m ef r o ma n a l y z i n gt h er u l i n g so ft h ej u d g e .
Our theoretical model has an exceedingly simple view of a trial. In the
model, the judge simply reveals the truth and does not need to communicate
with the two litigants. One might conjecture, however, that a more complex
model would predict that lawyers with high costs of collecting awards would
tend to exaggerate their claims for low-stakes cases. After all, why would a
lawyer ask for a “reasonable” amount if the lawyer would not bother collecting
a "reasonable" amount?
In column two of table 6 we estimate a model similar to equation 7 in which
the dependent variable continues to be posil for lawsuits that do not go to trial.
For lawsuits that do go to trial, however, we use as the dependent variable
a dummy for whether the judge declares her ruling to be favorable for the
ﬁrm. The parameter αl continues to measure, among other things, the lawyer’s
propensity to settle cases as opposed to dropping them. Since we do not estimate
20as i g n i ﬁcant coeﬃcient for γ2,w eﬁnd no evidence that lawyers who settle a
high fraction of non-tried cases have diﬀerential propensities to lose high- or
low-stakes cases outright.
In column three, however, we analyze the outcome of the judge’s ruling being
favorable to the worker. Our estimate of γ2 is -0.34 and signiﬁcant at the 0.01
level, which implies that lawyers who drop a lot of cases (presumably those with
high costs of collecting trial awards) are comparatively less likely to win low-
stakes cases outright. Finally, we analyze the probability of a "mixed" ruling in
column 4. Since we estimate that γ2 is 0.25 and statistically signiﬁcant at the
0.01 level, we ﬁnd evidence that lawyers who drop a lot of cases (presumably
those with high costs of collecting trial awards) are comparatively more likely
to get mixed rulings.
Our interpretation for these results on trial outcomes is the following. The
results on rulings that are favorable to the ﬁrm tell us that, when the stakes of
the case is low, judges do not tend to rule that lawyers who drop a lot of cases
(presumably those with high costs of collecting awards) bring for cases with no
merit. The results on rulings favorable to the worker tell us that judges tend not
to accept the entire claims of lawyers who drop a lot of cases when the stakes
of the case are low. Rather, the results on mixed rulings tell us that the judges
tend to say that, for low-stakes cases, lawyers who drop a lot of cases tend to
be exaggerating their claims.
The results from table 7 may explain why some workers make "ludicrous"
demands. Kaplan et. al. (2008) document that some workers make claims that
seem unreasonable. Workers who make these claims tend to go to trial more
often and tend not to be rewarded for these claims. Based on the evidence from
table 7, one might conjecture that these workers have high costs of collecting
awards. Our model would therefore be consistent with the observation that
these workers tend not to settle. Firms would be anticipating that these workers
would not collect their awards after trials and therefore would not be willing to
settle the cases.
7 Reconciling Theory and Evidence
Tables 5 and 6 present evidence that neither of the two sources of heterogeneity
across lawyers on their own can explain our empirical results. Recall that table 5
told us that the lawyers who drop low-stakes cases tend not to drop high-stakes
cases. Recall further from table 6 that lawyers who settle low-stakes cases tend
not to settle high-stakes cases. Since trials form a relatively small percentage of
outcomes, it would appear that those lawyers who drop low-stakes cases (and
tend not to drop high-stakes cases) are also those who tend not to settle low-
stakes cases (and do tend to settle high-stakes cases). We conﬁrm this fact
by looking at the correlation of the estimated values for αl for the 19 lawyers
across tables 5 and 6. The correlations are -0.93, -0.93, -0.87, and -0.81 using
the estimates from columns 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively.
We will now argue that the two sources of heterogeneity that we consider,
21when taken into account simultaneously, can be reconciled with the empirical
evidence. Let us suppose, for example, that the lawyers who disproportionately
drop high-stakes cases and disproportionately do not drop low-stakes cases have
better information. The fact that these lawyers disproportionately settle low-
stakes cases is perfectly consistent with having better information. The question
then becomes how we can reconcile the fact that these lawyers also dispropor-
tionately do not settle high-stakes cases? This result could only be reconciled
with our theory if the better-informed lawyers also had lower costs of collecting
awards.
It therefore seems that the best explanation of what we observe in the data
is that the lawyers with more accurate information about the quality of their
clients’ cases also have lower collection costs. Perhaps having more accurate
information and lower collection costs are in fact, simply reﬂections of being a
well-informed lawyer. A well-informed lawyer should understand the law better
and therefore should have a more accurate signal of the quality of the case. A
well-informed lawyer should also know how to handle the evasive techniques
employed by some ﬁrms, and therefore should have lower costs of collecting
judgments awarded by the judge.
8C o n c l u s i o n s
Government regulations, combined with the mechanisms through which regula-
tions are enforced, have a crucial impact on a country’s business climate. In this
paper, we analyzed the interaction between an extremely rigid labor law and a
court system that is ineﬃcient at enforcing the law. In particular, we used data
from a labor tribunal in Mexico to show that 56% of awards "won" by workers
were not collected. This never occurred in cases in which the worker had more
than seven years of tenure with the ﬁrm.
Although we could not analyze worker heterogeneity in lawsuit outcomes
directly, we could analyze heterogeneity across the lawyers representing them.
We showed empirically that those lawyers who drop a lot of cases tend not to
leave trial awards uncollected. One interpretation for this result is that better-
informed lawyers anticipate cases in which they would be unlikely to collect
the amount awarded at trial and drop these cases at earlier stages. Another
interpretation is that lawyers with high costs of collecting awards drop all low-
stakes cases and only go to trial with high-stakes cases.
In order to help us sort through these two interpretations, we developed a
simple theoretical model to help interpret the eﬀects of having a cost of collecting
awards after a trial. The model generated distinct testable hypotheses of how
workers (and the lawyers representing them) would act diﬀerently depending on
diﬀerences in the accuracy of their information and on diﬀerences in their costs
of collecting awards. We ﬁnd evidence that lawyers are diﬀerent both in terms
of the accuracy of their information and in terms of their collection costs.
We therefore see that the distinction between de facto and de jure labor reg-
ulation is a complex one. We show that diﬀerences in the information available
22to the worker aﬀect the application of labor law. We also show that when the
worker is more willing to defend her rights, either because the potential beneﬁts
are high or because her costs are low, labor law is applied more strictly. More
generally, we show that the worker herself is a crucial determinant of the degree
to which labor law is enforced.
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nN Mean Std Dev Min Max
tenure 1,906 3.76 4.85 0 39.86
gender 1,906 0.32 0.47 0 1
final payment (2000 pesos) 1,906 15,967 74,518 0 1,683,751
case settles 1,906 0.50 0.50 0 1
case dropped 1,906 0.28 0.45 0 1
case goes to trial 1,906 0.22 0.41 0 1
positive award at trial 
uncollected
202 0.61 0.49 0 1
N Mean Std Dev Min Max
tenure 665 3.12 4.86 0 47.08
gender 665 0.34 0.48 0 1
final payment (2000 pesos) 665 6,779 21,914 0 385,212
case settles 665 0.63 0.48 0 1
case dropped 665 0.26 0.44 0 1
case goes to trial 665 0.11 0.31 0 1
positive award at trial 
uncollected
45 0.56 0.50 0 1
N Mean Std Dev Min Max
tenure 580 3.02 4.60 0 34.91
gender 580 0.35 0.48 0 1
final payment (2000 pesos) 580 6,751 22,972 0 385,212
case settles 580 0.63 0.48 0 1
case dropped 580 0.26 0.44 0 1
case goes to trial 580 0.11 0.31 0 1
positive award at trial 
uncollected
42 0.57 0.50 0 1
All suits with private lawyers
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
All suits with publicly-appointed lawyers
Only publicly-appointed lawyers with at least one trial and at least one non-trialfemale tenure
All suits with private lawyers:                          
N=1906, F(989, 916) 1.682 *** 2.581 ***
All suits with public lawyers:                           
N=665, F(48, 616) 1.255 3.214 ***
Public lawyers with at least one trial and at 
least one non-trial: N=580, F(18, 561) 1.141 1.157
Table 2: Assignment of Cases to Lawyers                      
(F-statistics on joint significance of lawyer fixed effects)
Dependent Variable
Notes: The F-statistics correspond to tests of the joint significance of the 
lawyer fixed effects in models with no other independent variables. We use 
the notation of *** to denote significance at the 0.01 level. Similarly ** 
denotes significance at the 0.05 level and * denotes significance at the 0.10 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.-0.09 ** -0.09 ** -0.08 * -0.06
0.03 *** 0.07
0.00
0.63 *** 0.73 ***
-0.14 *** -0.29 **
0.00
-1.42 *** -1.61 **
Only tenure in lowest (<.55) or 
highest quartiles (>=3.595)
tenure level when lawyers 








































(tenure >= 3.58)*(dropping 
fraction when tenure < 3.58))









No:        
N=580
No:        
N=580
Yes:       
N=289
No:        
N=580
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All models are estimated with non-linear least 
squares using 19 lawyers. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the case is 
dropped, zero if the case is not dropped. Standard errors are calculated allowing for 
heteroscedasticity and for the possibility that the outcomes in cases that have been 
grouped into the same proceeding may be correlated. We use the notation of *** to denote 
significance at the 0.01 level. Similarly ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level and * 
denotes significance at the 0.10 level.0.08 * 0.07 0.07 0.04
0.08 *** 0.21 **
-0.01
0.91 *** 1.14 ***
-0.13 *** -0.32 **
0.01
-0.46 -0.79 ***
Only tenure in lowest (<.55) or 
highest quartiles (>=3.595)
(0.30)
No:        
N=580
No:        
N=580
Yes:       
N=289





(tenure >= 3.46)*(settlement 
fraction when tenure < 3.46))

































tenure level when lawyers 















Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All models are estimated with non-linear least 
squares using 19 lawyers. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the case is 
settled, zero if the case is not settled. Standard errors are calculated allowing for 
heteroscedasticity and for the possibility that the outcomes in cases that have been 
grouped into the same proceeding may be correlated. We use the notation of *** to denote 
significance at the 0.01 level. Similarly ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level and * 
denotes significance at the 0.10 level.0
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